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Comment
Robert E. Keeton*
I. A STEP FORWMD-SMALL BUT SIGNIFICANT
Part of the price we pay for a system wisely dedicated to evenhanded justice under law is that courts often fail to identify those
exceptional cases in which the highest aims of the system are served
rather than threatened by a judicial break with precedent. Thus it
happens that in the long, slow story of law reform, a recent case in
the Illinois courts raised hopes for a rare and distinctive breakthrough.
In Maki v. Frelk, responding to an invitation from the state's supreme court to reexamine the well entrenched rule that contributory
negligence of an injured person is a complete bar to recovery for
harm negligently caused by another, the appellate court for the
second district proposed to abrogate the traditional rule and establish
instead a rule apportioning damages.' On appeal, however, by a fiveto-two decision, the Supreme Court of Illinois adhered to the old rule
and suggested that if change is to come, it must come from the legislature.2 But since today's dissenting opinion may be tomorrow's judgment, Maki v. Frelk deserves to be rated not merely as an opportunity
lost, but also as a step forward toward more enlightened rules on the
legal effect of contributory fault. It is a small step, perhaps, but
significant nonetheless.
A. The Intermediate Court's Opinion
Though proposing abrogation of a long-standing rule, the intermediate, court's opinion in Maki v. Frelk is a model of restraint. Three
distinctive aspects of the opinion bear upon this appraisal.
1. Capitalizing on Illinois' Distinctive Precedents.-As luck would
have it, Illinois has a distinctive legal history on contributory fault.
The jurisprudence of most states contains no hint of decisional precedents for comparative negligence. Illinois, in contrast, has been
blessed with such treasures as these:
[1]n proportion to the negligence of the defendant, should be measured
the degree of care required of the plantiff-that is to say, the more gross the
* Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, B.B.A. 1940, LL.B. 1941, University
of Texas; S.J.D. 1956, Harvard Law School. Advisor to Reporter, RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND), ToRTs. Co-editor of SFAvEv, KEEroN & KEET N, CASES ON TORTS (2d cd.
1964).
1. 85 11. App. 2d 439, 229 N.E.2d 284 (1967).
2. Maid v. Frelk, 239 N.E.2d 445 (Ill. 1968).
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negligence manifested by the defendant, the less degree of care will be
required of the plaintiff to enable him to recover. . . . We say, then, that
S.. whenever it shall appear that the plaintiff's negligence is comparatively
slight, and that of the defendant gross, he shall not be deprived of his
action. 3

[Ilf the defendant was guilty of a higher degree of negligence . . .
[and that of the plaintiff] was greatly disproportioned or slight, he still
might recover. But we are not inclined to extend the rule . . . . [Plaintiff]

can not recover, unless the negligence of the defendant clearly and largely
exceeds his. 4
[A] plaintiff who is even guilty of slight negligence may recover of a

defendant who has been grossly negligent, or whose conduct has been
wanton or wilful. Hence the doctrine of comparative negligence.5

Observe, as did the appellate court for the second district, 6 that
though these Illinois precedents referred to the rule as one of "comparative negligence," no attempt was made to apportion damages.
Plaintiff recovered all or nothing, in theory, though one may suppose
that such "comparative negligence" instructions did in fact encourage
juries to compromise by blinking at contributory negligence and
reducing damages.
In time, this early Illinois version of comparative negligence was
abandoned in favor of a set of contributory fault rules essentially like
those in most other states. The appellate court makes the interesting
and suggestive comparison that this occurred with the increase in
master-servant cases incident to the Industrial Revolution, whereas
the current reexamination is spurred by a new revolution-the transportation revolution-that clogs our courts with accident cases and
confronts us with the dilemma that "negligence" no longer has its
earlier significance, because today-we find that "anyone can have an
accident."7
In light of this history of an early "comparative negligence" rule in
Illinois, the intermediate court in the instant case was able to reason
that adopting a "comparative negligence" rule in 1967 is returning
to a principle once recognized and later abandoned. The court was
candid, however, in observing that the old rule did not apportion
damages. Thus at best, the proposed change is a return to an earlier
principle but not to an earlier rule. But changing a legal rule for the
purpose of serving more effectively in a new context a basic principle
3. Galena & Chi. Union R.R. v. Jacobs, 20 IM.478, 497 (1858).
379, 389-90 (1870).
4. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Baches, 55 Ill.

5. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Hammer, 72 Ill.
347, 351 (1874).
6. Maki v. Frelk, 85 Ill.
App. 2d at 445, 229 N.E.2d at 287-88.
7. Id. at 446, 229 N.E.2d at 288.
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that was served by a different rule in a different context is accomplishing change with fidelity to a traditional of judicial restraint.
2. Limiting Retroactivity.-The decision of the intermediate court
in Maki v. Frelk was cautiously limited, too, in relation to retroactivity. The new rule of apportioning damages in cases of contributory fault was declared to apply only to the instant case and other
cases based on future occurrences. 8 There has been much controversy
about prospective overruling9 (or, as viewed from another perspective,
limitation of an overruling decision to prospective, but not retroactive, application generally). 1° Even more controversial, perhaps, is
the technique of applying the new rule retroactively only to the case
at hand." But indisputably, this combination is a more cautious and
restrained course of action than fully retroactive overruling; indeed
in part, controversy over this technique is spawned by critics who
think the courts should do more. This is not to say, however, that
prospective overruling is traditional. This form of judicial action was
relatively unfamiliar as recently as the 1950's. But in Illinois'29 and
a few other states13 it is today an accepted technique. Thus, the
intermediate court's decision in Maki v. Frelk was breaking no new
ground in this respect.
3. Limiting Apportionment.-A third way in which the intermediate
court's action in Maki v. Frelk was cautiously limited concerns the
scope of the new rule of apportioning damages. It was declared to
be applicable only if the injured person's negligence "was not as
great as" that of the defendant. 14 As noted by the court, there is
8. Id. at 453, 229 N.E.2d at 291.
9. See, e.g., Mishkin, The Supreme Court, 1964 Term-Foreword: The High Court,
the Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HAuv. L. REv. 56 (1965).
10. Id. at 58, 65. Professor Mishkin points out that the power of prospective limitation, if recognized at all, should be extended not only to instances of overrulings, but
also to instances in which there is a substantial change from what has been previously
considered the law, even if no specific precedent is overruled.
11. See discussion in subsection B of Part II infra.
12. E.g., McDaniel v. Bullard, 34 Ill. 2d 487, 216 N.E.2d 140 (1966); Darling v.
Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965); Dini v.
Naiditch, 20 III. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960); Molitor v. Kaneland Community
Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968
(1960).
13. E.g., Myers v. Genesee County Auditor, 375 Mich. 1, 133 N.W.2d 190 (1965);
Parker v. Port Huron Hosp., 361 Mich. 1, 26-28, 105 N.W.2d 1, 13-15 (1960); Myers
v. Drozda, 180 Neb. 183, 141 N.W.2d 852 (1966); Moran v. Quality Aluminum
Casting Co., 34 Wis. 2d 542, 150 N.W.2d 137 (1967); Kojis v. Doctors Hosp., 12
Wis. 2d 367, 107 N.W.2d 131, modified on rehearing, 12 Wis. 2d 367, 107 N.W.2d
292 (1961).
14. 85 Ill. App. 2d at 451, 229 N.E.2d at 290.
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precedent for this limited rule in some statutes, 15 but others have enacted a broader or "pure" rule of apportionment that applies even
when the plaintiff's negligence is greater than defendant's. 16 This,
too, is a debatable choice, and the court took the more cautiously
restrained course in leaving a substantial area for application of the

old rule of contributory fault as a complete bar. Indeed, in theory,
it might be said that the court left about as much scope for the old
rule as it set apart for the new, since one might suppose that there
are about as many cases in which an injured person is as much or
more at fault than anyone else in bringing about his injuries as there
are cases in which someone else was more at fault than he. When due
consideration is given to the greater practical pressures in favor of
finding defendants negligent, however, it becomes apparent that, in
fact, far less scope is preserved for the old rule. Yet it remains true
that in this choice, as in others, the intermediate court takes the
course of judicial restraint in effecting change.
B. The Opinions in the Supreme Court of Illinois
The position adopted by the majority in the supreme court is
summed up in two brief sentences from the majority opinion:
After full consideration we think, however, that such a far-reaching change
[as overruling the contributory negligence rule in favor of a rule of apportionment], if desirable, should be made by the legislature rather than

to
by the court. The General Assembly is the department of government
17
which the constitution has entrusted the power of changing the laws.

A minor theme is also sounded:
As amici have pointed out, the General Assembly has incorporated the
present doctrine of contributory negligence as an integral part of statutes
dealing with a number of particular subjects ... and the legislative branch
is manifestly in a better position than is this court to consider the numerous

problems involved.' 8

The latter part of this assertion is perhaps ambiguous. If construed as an assertion that a legislature is in a better position in general to consider problems involved in fashioning a new rule of apportionment, the statement seems unsound for reasons explained
later in this article.' 9 It seems unsound also if construed as an assertion that a legislature is in a better position to consider that particular
15. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1730.1, 27-1730.2 (1962); Wis.
(1961).
16. E.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 1454 (1942).
17. Maki v. Frelk, 239 N.E.2d 445, 447 (IMI.1968).
18. Id. at 447-48 (emphasis added).
19. See text accompanying notes 26-27.

STAT.

§ 331.045

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 21

set of problems arising from the fact that the legislature has enacted
a number of statutes incorporating the contributory fault rule expressly or impliedly. The dissenting opinion wisely observes:
These statutes indicate to me only a legislative awareness of the rule or
a design to avoid the harsh result of its operation. I do not know of a

legislative declaration that it is to be the rule of this State that a plaintiff to
whom any want of care whatever attaches be barred from recovering. Too,

it must be remembered in evaluating the validity of the majority's holding
that the various positions Illinois has taken on the question of contributory

negligence have been taken by actions of this court and not by legislative
action. It can be argued that the legislature's inaction in this area is attributable to its feeling that it is more appropriate, 2considering
the history
0
of the question in Illinois, for the judiciary to act.

II.

AN ASSESSMENT OF BROADER APPLICATIONS OF

CoMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE

Understandably and quite properly, neither the majority nor the
dissenting opinion in the Supreme Court deals with problems of detail and method that the intermediate court faced in proposing abrogation of the contributory negligence rule. Though omitted from
the opinions in light of the decision reached by the majority, however,
these are among the questions a judge would wish to consider in
deciding whether to cast his judicial vote for overruling the contributory negligence rule; the feasibility of any alternative rule and of its
implementation must be given thoughtful attention before a vote is
cast to embark on this new route.

Is it essential to the propriety of judicial action, such as that proposed by the intermediate court, that a court make the more cautiously restrained choices, first, to preserve the rule that contributory fault
bars if the injured person was as much or more at fault than the
defendant and, second, to overrule prospectively except as to the case
at hand rather than retroactively in general? Further, was the intermediate court's position critically dependent on the distinctive history
of precedents on "comparative negligence" in Illinois? Or would it
be appropriate-perhaps even equally appropriate-for comparative

negligence to be adopted by judicial decision in states with a consistent history of judicial pronouncements for the rule that contributory negligence is a complete bar?
These questions will be faced as advocates elsewhere seek to establish the comparative negligence doctrine in their respective jurisdictions.
20. 239 N.E.2d at 450.
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A. "Pure"or "Partial" Comparative Negligence
The "pure" form of comparative negligence seems the superior rule
of apportionment. It is difficult to justify discriminating between the
case in which the plaintiff is a little more negligent than the defendant
and the case in which the defendant is a little more negligent than
the plaintiff. Apportionment seems a fairer solution in both cases than
making one party bear all his own loss. Moreover, in one sense, the
more limited form of comparative negligence would only aggravate
this unfair discrimination if it really worked according to its theory,
because the party a little more negligent would bear all his own loss
plus a little more than half the loss flowing from the injury to the
other. The fact that we may believe that as a practical matter it
would not work that way-that juries would still blink at the greater
negligence of the more severely injured person so as to allow compensation-is no good reason for adding to the pressures of sympathy as
this rule would do. It would add a new pressure to find the defendant
at least more negligent than the plaintiff so as to evade the rule that
the more severely injured but more negligent plaintiff is supposed
to receive no compensation at all.B. Special Treatment of the Case at Hand
On the narrow question whether a prospective overruling shall be
applied also to the case at hand, the negative seems the better answer.
Applying the new rule only to the case at hand and future cases
discriminates between, first, the case in which the plaintiff and his
lawyer dispose of the claim by settlement or otherwise in reliance
on precedents that contributory negligence bars and, second, the case
in which the plaintiff and his lawyer take an appeal and secure an
overruling decision. Even apart from the curiosity of thus rewarding
peaceful protest more than fidelity to existing law, it is hard to find
good grounds for rewarding one litigant alone (or only him and others
whose claims are closely related to his). Surely it is often largely
fortuity that his is the case so rewarded-that is, often many other
factors rather than his deserving conduct bring about the result that
his is the case in which the overruling decision occurs.
Moreover, the reliance interests, on the basis of which it is argued
that a fully retroactive decision would be improper, seem- to be outweighed by other factors in relation to this specific rule that contributory fault bars. Added to the injustice of the rule, and its consequent unfairness to all those whose claims it affects, adversely, is the
fact that the deviations from its application are widespread but lacking in evenhandedness. That is, the unpoliced and unlawful apportion-
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ment of damages that occurs in many jury awards today adds irregularity in its application to all the other injustices of the present rule.
If overruling is the answer, then outright, retroactive overruling-the
kind of overruling that was traditionally used in the few overruling
decisions that occurred more than a decade ago-is the kind more
appropriate to this problem.
C. How Distinctive Are the IllinoisPrecedents?
Every state has its devices for excusing the plaintiff from the bar
of contributory fault. Sometimes it is a version of last clear chance, 2'
sometimes it is a dichotomy distinguishing conditions from causes, 2
and sometimes it is a rule that ordinary contributory negligence is no
bar to damages for harm caused by defendant's recklessness2 3 All
such devices are, in a sense, ways of comparing the conduct of the
plaintiff with the conduct of the defendant on some kind of standardqualitative, quantitative, or a bit of both. The Illinois precedents for
"comparative negligence" may have differed more in terminology
than in substance from these excuses from the bar of contributory
fault that have been recognized in other jurisdictions. The lack of
precedents like those of Illinois should not deter a court of another
jurisdiction from following the lead of the intermediate court and the
dissenting justices of the Illinois Supreme Court in supporting a rule
of apportioning damages. The choice should be made, instead, on
more basic considerations-among them the substantive merits of
apportioning damages and the fundamental issues of legal process
involved in determining whether changes are to be made by courts
or legislatures. The remainder of this article will be directed to these
more basic issues.

III.

APPORTIONmENT OR COMPLETE BAlI

Concerning the relative merits of a rule of apportionment and a rule
that contributory fault bars completely, the legal literature is extensive0 4 and the better choice seems clear. The rule that contributory
21. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 479, 480 (1965).
22. E.g., Wall v. King, 280 Mass. 577, 182 N.E. 855 (1932).
23. See, e.g., RESTATE ENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 503 (1965).
24. See, e.g., C. GRE ORY, LEGISLATIVE Loss DIsTImuTnoN IN NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS

(1936); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAmeS, TORTS §§ 22.1-22.3 at 1193-1209, § 22.11 at 123641

(1956);

LNsTrrTE

OF

JUDICIAL

ADMINISTRtATION,

COMPARATIVE

NEGLIGENCE

(1955, Supp. 1959); W. PROSSEn, TORTS § 66 at 443-449 (3d ed. 1964); G. WILLIAMIS,
JOINT TORTS AND CoNTRmUToRy NEGcLiENE
(1951); Gregory, Loss Distribution by

Comparative Negligence, 21 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1936); Maloney, From Contributory to
Comparative Negligence: A Needed Law Reform, 11 U. FLA. L. REV. 135 (1958);
Mole & Wilson, A Study of Comparative Negligence, 17 CORNELL L.Q. 333, 604
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fault bars completely is a curious departure from the central principle
of nineteenth century Anglo-American tort law-that wrongdoers
should bear the losses they cause. Comparative negligence more
faithfully serves that central principle by causing the wrongdoers to
share the burden of resulting losses in reasonable relation to their
wrongdoing, rather than allocating the heavier burden to the one who,
as luck would have it, happened to be more severely injured. Nor is
the rule that contributory fault bars recovery any more defensible
within the framework of modem trends toward strict liability. It is
a rule that few legal writers today even attempt to defend on the
merits.
The contributory fault rule is heartily disapproved by laymen too.
Countless jury verdicts in negligence cases represent deviations of the
law in action from the law in theory; juries are instructed that contributory negligence is a complete bar, but they are permitted, in
fact, to apply a rough, largely unpoliced, and uneven form of comparative negligence. Thus the need for change is compelling, not only
because comparative negligence is superior to the contributory negligence rule on the merits, but also because the existing clash between
law and practice is a deplorable blight on the legal system.
IV. OTBER QuSTsIoNs OF SuBsTANTIvE LAW

Consistently with traditional judicial method, and quite appropriately it would seem, the intermediate court's opinion in Maki v. Frelk
and the opinion of the dissenting justices of the Supreme Court do not
attempt to anticipate and answer the many questions that will arise
over the course of time as courts fashion a suitable doctrine of comparative negligence. Is percentage apportionment the ideal solution?
If ideal for some cases, is it so for all? Perhaps it is fair to say that
in our preoccupation with the major question whether to abrogate the
rule that contributory fault bars, we have rarely turned our minds to
the question whether rules better than those of the existing comparative negligence statutes and decisions could be developed. Perhaps
there are even better ways of serving the principle that the burden of
loss should be allocated fairly among those whose negligence contributed to it. For example, might it be better, either in general or
for some particular classes of cases, to bar damages for pain and
suffering, limiting the negligent plaintiff's right of recovery to what(1932); Peck, Comparative Negligence and Automobile Liability Insurance, 58 Mrcss.
L. REv. 689 (1960); Philbrick, Loss Apportionment in Negligence Cases, 99 U. PA.
L. R1v. 572, 766 (1951); Rosenberg, Comparative Negligence in Arkansas: A "Before
and After" Survey, 13 Aux. L. REv. 89 (1959); Turk, Comparative Negligence on the
March, 28 Cm.-KFNTr L. REv. 189, 304 (1950).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 21

ever proportion of the economic loss seems appropriate to the factfinder in light of the relative fault of the parties and the denial of
damages for pain and suffering? An obvious characteristic-arguably
a disadvantage-of such a rule is the want of effective controls over
the broad discretion it would openly grant to juries. But one may
question the extent to which the scope of discretion under such a
rule would exceed that which juries in fact possess under percentage
rules of apportionment or under the practical operation of a rule
that theoretically bars the plaintiff completely for contributory fault.
Indeed, such a rule would at least place some objective limits on the
range of discretion-limits related to economic loss. The ptu-pose
here, however, is not to propose a comparative negligence rule that
excludes damages for pain and suffering but only to suggest that
familiar rules of comparative negligence may not be beyond improvement. Moreover, even apart from any such substantial challenge as
this to familiar rules of comparative negligence, there are many
questions of detail that a court making the basic change to comparative negligence may wisely leave for resolution in the future.21 In
doing so, it will be following the lead of legislatures, since comparative negligence statutes have commonly been inexplicit on many
questions of detail.
V. IssUEs OF LEGAL PROCESS

The major issue of legal process-the question whether a court
should change the outmoded contributory negligence rule or instead
wait for the legislature of its state to act-is actively disputed. There
is little doubt that ten years ago a majority of judges and perhaps
academic commentators as well would have answered that this is a
task for legislatures. A significant change has occurred in these ten
years. More than half of the state courts of last resort have contributed to a total of more than ninety overruling decisions on more
than thirty separate rules of tort law.26 It is becoming an accepted
25. Among these are questions concerning "difficulties of administering comparative
negligence in multi-party litigation [consider, for example, the claim of P, who is 40%
at fault, against A and B who are respectively 40% and 20% at fault, or the claim
of Q, who is 30% at fault, against C and D who are respectively 40% and 30% at
fault]; the device of special interrogatories to juries in aid of judicial control and
judicial review of comparative negligence findings by juries; . . . whether liability
insurance [does or] ought to cover only the liability of an insured after an offset because of his own losses or whether -insurance [does-or] ought to cover percentages
of loss proportioned to fault without offset; [and] problems relating to comparative
contribution; ......
R. KEEToN & J. O'CoNNELL, BAsIC PnOTECnrxON FOR M TlTAFFIC
Vicrnmr 521-22 (1965) (footnotes omitted). Another such question is the continued
role of "assumption of risk" once comparative negligence is adopted.
26. Most of such decisions through the years 1958-65 are collected in Keeton,
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principle that courts should take a more active role in reforming
outmoded tort law than they had done before this past decade. Although no judicial opinions previous to those filed in Maki v. Frelk
had brought this new spirit to bear upon the contributory negligence
rule, this seems a very appropriate area for law reform by judicial
decision. Moreover, consideration of this possibility has been suggested in at least one other judicial opinion, which is interesting as
well for what it holds in relation to apportionment in a case of suc27
cessive injuries.
Courts are at least as well situated as legislatures to inform themselves about all the factors that should be taken into account even
for fashioning a new doctrine in full detail and announcing it all at
once. They are better situated than legislatures for developing a
doctrine of comparative negligence gradually, resolving questions of
detail as they are presented in the context of concrete cases, rather
than attempting-always unsuccessfully-to anticipate and answer at
once every question that may arise in the future.
Inertia of the process imposes a heavy burden, apart from the
merits, on any proposal for legislation. This burden weighs most
heavily on proposals for reforming legal doctrine developed through
the common law tradition of case decisions. This factor must be
weighed, however, along with the values underlying stare decisis. It
is especially relevant in this weighing process that a wide-scale judicial
change to comparative negligence would produce less stress on the
doctrine of stare decisis than is commonly supposed.
The essence of stare decisis is continuity, and sometimes continuity
is better served by changing a rule than by steadfastly adhering to it.
The point is well expressed by the New York Court of Appeals in
Judicial Law Reform-A Perspective on the Performance of Appellate Courts, 44 TFx.
L. REV. 1254 (1966). The question of legal process discussed briefly in the text here
is more fully explored, both generally and in relation to the contributory fault rule

particularly, in this article and in Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75
HAIv. L. REv. 463 (1962). The outline of a proposed judicial opinion on the subject
appears at 508-09 of the latter article.
27. Loui v. Oakley, 438 P.2d 393 (Hawaii 1968). Plaintiff was injured by several
alleged tortfeasors in accidents occurring months and years apart. Held, error for the
trial court to instruct the jury that if it could not apportion the damages by a preponderance of the evidence it could hold the first alleged tortfeasor liable for the
total of all damages to which his conduct contributed, even though aggravated by
later accidents. If the jury is unable to determine by a preponderance of the evidence
how much of the plaintiff's damages can be attributed to the defendant's negligence,
it should make a rough apportionment, and if the evidence is insufficient for such
apportionment, it should allocate the damages equally among all the accidents regardless of the possibility that the plaintiff may, for any reason, such as contributory negligence or limitations, be barred from recovering from one or more of the alleged
tortfeasors. The opinion calls attention to the .relationship of this problem. to comparative negligence and suggests that the time may be ripe for judicial reconsideration of
the rule that contributory negligence is a complete bar.
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Bing v. Thunig2 8 That court, rather than rest a decision on the ground
that negligence of nurses at a hospital might be classified as "administrative" and not "medical," chose to overrule precedents for the
hospitals immunity. The court observed that, from the earlier decisions applying the administrative-medical distinction, "there is to be
deduced neither guiding principle nor clear delineation of policy; they
cannot help but cause confusion, cannot help but create doubt and
uncertainty.29
Comparative negligence is more faithful than contributory negligence to the principle of basing liability on fault. It adheres more
fully to that theme. Sometimes fidelity to principle contributes more
than fidelity to specific rules could contribute to the objectives that
underlie the doctrine of stare decisis-to stability, predictability and
evenhandedness of law.
In relation to contributory negligence, as elsewhere in the law,
uncertainty and lack of evenhandedness are produced by casuistic
distinctions. This has happened, for example, in doctrines of last clear
chance and in distinctions between what is enough to sustain a finding
of primary negligence and what more is required to sustain a finding
of contributory negligence. Perhaps even more significant, however,
is the casuistry of tolerating blatant jury departure from evenhanded
application of the legal rules of negligence and contributory negligence, with the consequence that a kind of rough apportionment of
damages occurs, but in unpoliced, irregular, and unreasonably discriminatory fashion. Moreover, the existence of this practice sharply
reduces the true scope of the substantive change effected by openly
adopting comparative negligence.
Thus, stability, predictability, and evenhandedness are better served
-by the change to comparative negligence than by adhering in theory
to a law that contributory fault bars when this rule has ceased to be
the law in practice.
VI. CONCLUSION

The views expressed here lead inexorably to the conclusion that
courts of the many jurisdictions with no history of precedents for
comparative negligence should not delay in overruling the outmoded
doctrine of contributory negligence. They lead, also, to the conclusion
that it would even better serve the interests of justice if the overruling
were fully retroactive, and if the new rule of apportionment were
not limited to cases in which the defendant's negligence was greater
28. 2 N.Y.2d 656, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957).
29. Id. at 661, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 6, 143 N.E.2d at 5.
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than the plaintiff's. But lest these expressions of preference for a
solution differing in detail from that of the intermediate court in
Maki v. Frelk be misconstrued as more critical than they are intended
to be, let it be clear that the three choices of the course of restraintin relying on the distinctive Illinois history of precedents, in overruling prospectively except as to the case at hand, and in preserving
the contributory negligence rule for cases in which defendant's negligence is not greater than plaintiff's-are defensible as ways of satisfying a compelling need for change while using methods that offer as
little challenge to continuity as possible. My applause for the dissenting justices in the supreme court and for the justices of the Appellate
Court for the Second District of Illinois is unrestrained.

